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AUCTIONS WITH LEAKS ABOUT EARLY BIDS: ANALYSIS AND
EXPERIMENTAL BEHAVIOR
SVEN FISCHER , WERNER GÜTH , TODD R. KAPLAN and RO’I ZULTAN ∗
In sequential first- and second-price private value auctions, second movers are
informed about the first movers’ bid with commonly known probability. Equilibrium
bidding in first-price auctions is mostly unaffected, but there are multiple equilibria
in second-price auctions affecting comparative statics across price rules. We show
experimentally that informational leaks in first-price auctions qualitatively confirm
the theoretical predictions. In second-price auctions, we analyze and experimentally
confirm the existence of focal equilibria, and provide evidence for individual consistency
in equilibrium selection. (JEL D44, C72, C91)
I. INTRODUCTION
Most theoretical and experimental studies of
sealed-bid auctions assume simultaneous bidding
(Kagel 1995; Kaplan and Zamir 2014). Nonethe-
less, in government procurement or when sell-
ing a privately owned company (such as an NBA
franchise), the auctioneer may approach bid-
ders separately, the auction may be open for an
extended period of time, or bidding firms/groups
go through a protracted procedure of authorizing
the bid—which may imply a sequential timing of
decisions (cf. Bulow and Klemperer 2009). This
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provides an environment in which bids may leak
to competitors who have yet to place a bid.1
Recent studies attempted to estimate
the prevalence of such information leaks.
Andreyanov, Davidson, and Korovkin (2018)
identified leaks in Russian procurement auctions
by assuming that the corrupt bidder who receives
a leak—presumably via the auctioneer—bids
near the closing of the auction after all the other
bidders placed their bids, and the winning bid is
close in value to the runner up. The data support
the existence of widely prevalent leaks. Ivanov
and Nesterov (2019) elaborated the analysis
using machine learning methods to estimate that
leaks occurred in 16% of over 600,000 auctions
studied.
Our paper complements these studies by
analyzing, theoretically and experimentally,
situations in which bidding is sequential and
information leaks about earlier bids are possible.
Although the available field evidence is from
first-price auctions (FPA), our analysis encom-
passes both first- and second-price auctions
1. The auctioneer may also ask for an updated bid as, for
example, in government procurement auctions where follow-
ing initial bids, bidders are often requested to submit a best
and final bid.
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(SPA). The analysis for second-price auctions
extends to English, or ascending bid auctions,
under the assumption that the bidding strategy
is determined “in the office,” before the bidding
process commences. This predetermination ren-
ders the risk of leaks very relevant. In the field,
the probability of a leak can be manipulated in
various ways. Early movers can actively leak
information; late movers can engage in industrial
espionage or bribe the auctioneer, whereas sellers
may try to prevent leaks through legal action or
by imposing strict simultaneity of bids. As a first
step in studying these environments, we assume
exogenously given and commonly known leak
probabilities and analyze the effects on bidding
behavior and outcomes.
Several theoretical papers consider revi-
sions of bids due to corruption. Menezes and
Monteiro (2006) and Lengwiler and Wolfstet-
ter (2010) assume that corrupt auctioneers offer
the auction winner to revise their bid. Arozamena
and Weinschelbaum (2009) analyze the effect of
corruption on bidding in first-price auctions in an
environment similar to ours under different value
distributions. Our contribution to this literature
is as follows. First, we extend the analysis of
first-price auctions to risk-averse bidders and
a continuum of leak probabilities, and provide
experimental evidence supporting the theoretical
analysis. Second, we analyze and characterize
different equilibria in second-price auctions with
leaks, and show experimentally that empirical
bidding is consistent with three focal equilibria.
Our model considers independently and iden-
tically distributed private value auctions with two
bidders and an exogenously given and commonly
known probability of the first bid being leaked to
the second bidder before her bidding. We derive
how the equilibria of the first- and second-price
sequential auction depend on leak probability and
are affected by risk aversion. For first-price auc-
tions, we extend the results of Arozamena and
Weinschelbaum (2009) to show that for power
function distributions of valuations—such as the
uniform distribution—the unique equilibrium is
invariant with leak probability for all CRRA util-
ity functions. In this equilibrium, a second bid-
der who observes a first bid below her value
wins the auction at the price equal to the first
bid. Leaks, therefore, result in the second mover
(SM) sometimes winning the auction in situa-
tion where the first bidder has a higher value
and would have won if not for the leak. Further-
more, when the second mover’s value is higher,
the leak lowers the price she has to pay the
seller. Consequently, an increase in leak proba-
bility increases the expected payoff of the second
bidder while reducing that of the first bidder, the
seller surplus and overall efficiency.
For second-price auctions, we show that mul-
tiple equilibria exist. These differ in the second
bidder’s strategy upon learning that the first bid
exceeds her own value. In this case, a rational
loser essentially sets the price for the first bidder,
thus allocating the surplus between the first bid-
der and the seller.2 While there is a continuum of
rational loser bids, we distinguish three focal bids
resulting in very different equilibria: (a) truth-
ful bidding of the rational loser—equivalent to
the value-bidding equilibrium of the simultane-
ous auction—in which the rational loser bids his
value; (b) spiteful bidding in which the ratio-
nal loser slightly underbids the first bid3; and
(c) cooperative bidding, where the bid equals the
reserve price of the seller.
The auction’s outcome strongly depends on
the selected equilibrium. With truthful bidding,
leaked information is ignored, hence the leak
has no effect on buyer surplus, seller revenue,
or efficiency. In all other equilibria, efficiency
decreases as the probability of a leak increases,
with seller revenue and efficiency reaching a min-
imum in the cooperative equilibrium. Compared
to truthful bidding (with or without leaks), the
expected payoff for the first bidder is higher in the
cooperative equilibrium and lower in the spiteful
equilibrium, and vice versa for second bidders.
These differences become more extreme as the
probability of a leak increases.
Given these results, whether an auctioneer or
a social planner should prefer the first- or second-
price rule depends not only on equilibrium selec-
tion in the second-price auction but also, in some
cases, on the probability of a leak. For example,
efficiency under low leak probabilities is higher
in all equilibria of the second-price auction com-
pared to the equilibrium of the first-price auc-
tion. For high leak probabilities, however, it may
be either higher or lower, depending on which
equilibrium the bidders coordinate on. Thus,
2. We use the term rational loser to reflect that winning
the auction would result in a negative payoff. It may still
be rational to win the auction if the bidder enjoys a joy of
winning. Joy of winning, however, does not provide a good
description of behavior in experimental auctions (Levin, Peck,
and Ivanov 2016).
3. Morgan, Steiglitz, and Reis (2003) proposed spite as
a potential explanation for overbidding in second price auc-
tions. Nishimura et al. (2011) and Kirchkamp and Mill (2019)
provide experimental support for spite as a motive in
auctions.
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our results establish that possible espionage and
leaks should be taken into consideration along-
side other factors when designing an auction.4
We conducted an experiment to test actual
human behavior in first- and second-price auc-
tions with probabilistic leaks. In first-price auc-
tions, the experiment provides a test bed for the
qualitative theoretical predictions regarding the
effects of leaks on bidding behavior, expected
allocations, and efficiency. The results largely
confirm the theoretical predictions. We find that
first mover (FM) bids do not vary systematically
with leak probabilities. Informed second bidders
generally behaved rationally, winning the auction
if and only if they can gain by doing so. Over-
all, leaks increase the second bidder’s payoff and
reduce the first bidder’s payoff, seller revenue,
and efficiency.
In second-price auctions, the experiment
allows us to explore equilibrium selection with
leaks. Empirically investigating equilibrium
selection is important because ex ante it is not
clear which equilibrium will be favored—as all
equilibria have desirable features for certain bid-
ders.5 In the field, equilibrium selection is likely
to be influenced by various factors, limiting the
generalizability of our results—as it would any
results, be it laboratory or field data. Nonethe-
less, we provide meaningful evidence that, even
sans the sundry pressures existing in the field,
people tend to follow the three focal equilibria
outlined above in a fairly consistent manner.
The three equilibria are able to organize most of
the data, with different individuals gravitating
towards different equilibria. Given the distribu-
tion of strategies in the experiment, higher leak
probabilities were associated, on average, with
lower efficiency while not affecting the surplus
allocation in a systematic way. Comparing the
two auction rules, we find that, without leaks,
seller revenue is higher with the first-price rule
as is often observed in experimental auctions
(Kagel and Levin 2016). The revenue dominance
of the first-price rules disappears, and possibly
4. For example, possible collusion is taken in the the-
oretical literature as a justification for using the first-price
rule (Fehl and Güth 1987; Güth and Peleg 1996; Marshall
and Marx 2007; Robinson 1985), though the experimental
evidence is mixed (e.g., Hinloopen and Onderstal 2014; Hu,
Offerman, and Onderstal 2011; Llorente-Saguer and Zul-
tan 2017) for experimental evidence.
5. Truthful bidding is simple and frugal as well as ex-
ante egalitarian. The cooperative equilibrium maximizes the
bidders’ joint surplus. The spiteful equilibrium is best, in
expectation, for the second bidder—who arguably has the
most influence on equilibrium selection.
reverses as leak probability increases, provid-
ing illustrative evidence for the importance of
incorporating leaks into auction design.
Our results contribute more broadly to several
literatures. First, the sequential protocol has been
studied, theoretically and experimentally, in the
context of contests (Fonseca 2009; Hoffmann and
Rota-Graziosi 2012; Segev and Sela 2014) and
asymmetric bidders (Cohensius and Segev 2017).
Although no previous study looked at the effect
of equilibrium selection in second-price auc-
tions with sequential moves, this topic has been
indirectly addressed in ascending bid auctions.
Cassady (1967) suggests, based on anecdotal evi-
dence, that placing a high initial bid can deter
other bidders from entry, which may be ratio-
nal when participation or information acquisi-
tion is costly (Daniel and Hirshleifer 2018; Fish-
man 1988).6
Our study is also related to the litera-
ture on information revelation in auctions
(Gershkov 2009; Kaplan 2012; Milgrom and
Weber 1982; Persico 2000). Several papers
study revelation of information about bidders’
valuations by the auctioneer (Bergemann and
Pesendorfer 2007; Eső and Szentes 2007; Kaplan
and Zamir 2000; Landsberger et al. 2001). As
in our study, Fang and Morris (2006) and Kim
and Che (2004) compare first- and second-
price mechanisms but focus on value revelation
rather than on leaked bids. The predictions
of Kim and Che (2004) were experimentally
tested and corroborated by Andreoni, Che, and
Kim (2007). The remainder of the paper is orga-
nized as follows. We describe and analyze the
bidding contests in Section II. The experimental
design is described in Section III, the findings
are discussed in Section IV, and Section V
concludes.
II. MODEL
Two bidders i = 1, 2, compete via bidding
to buy a single indivisible good over two time
periods. Each bidder i has private value vi drawn
independently from the continuous distribution F
on [0, 1], with 0 denoting the exogenously given
reservation price of the seller. At time 1 bidder
1, the first mover, submits an unconditional bid
6. See Avery (1998) for an analysis of jump bidding with
affiliated values. See also Ariely, Ockenfels, and Roth (2005),
Ockenfels and Roth (2006), and Roth and Ockenfels (2002)
for an analysis of second-price auctions with endogenous
timing.
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b1(v1). At time 2 bidder 2, the second mover,
observes b1 with probability p, and submits a con-
ditional bid b2(b1, v2), and with the complemen-
tary probability 1− p does not see b1 and submits
an unconditional bid b2(∅, v2). In case of a tie,
it is assumed throughout that bidder 2 wins. The
allocation and payments are determined either by
the first-price auction (FPA) or second-price auc-
tion (SPA). We assume risk aversion, captured by
utility function ui(vi −𝜛i) being concave and dif-
ferentiable, and with 𝜛i denoting the price paid
by the winner which is either bi in the FPA or b−i
in the SPA. Losing pays u(0) = 0.
A. First-Price Auction
Our analysis extends Arozamena and Wein-
schelbaum (2009) to a continuous combination
of a simultaneous and sequential bidding game
and adding risk aversion. More specifically for
the former, while in Arozamena and Weinschel-
baum (2009) a leak occurs with certainty, in our
case it occurs with probability p∈ [0, 1]. Clearly,
in the case of the FPA, a bidder, who is informed
about his opponent’s bid, will match the other bid
when she can still gain from winning and will
underbid when she cannot gain from winning.
Given this strategy of the second bidder, we solve
for the equilibrium strategies at time 1 in Propo-
sition 1 (for the proof, see Appendix A.1).
PROPOSITION 1. For F uniform and CRRA
utility with symmetric Arrow-Pratt risk aver-
sion parameter of r satisfying 0≤ r < 1, the
unique equilibrium bids are (b1(v1) = v1/(2− r);
b2(∅, v2) = v2/(2− r)).
The CRRA results mirror those of Cox, Smith,
and Walker (1985, 1988). In equilibrium neither
first nor conditional or unconditional second bids
are affected by leak probability, but leaks can
affect who wins and how much bidders earn (see
Appendix A.2).
COROLLARY 1. For F uniform, risk neutrality
(r = 0), and the first-price auction, bidder 1 ex


















The second-price auction has multiple equilib-
ria in weakly undominated strategies when p> 0.
While Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009) in
the context of leaks in SPA only consider the
equilibrium of truth-telling, we characterize all
equilibria in weakly undominated strategies, and
explore three focal ones in detail.7
When bidder 2 does not see 1’s bid, it
is weakly dominant to bid truthfully (Vick-
rey 1961):
(1) b2(∅, v2) = v2 for all v2.
If bidder 2 observes that b1 exceeds v2, she will
underbid b1. We refer to such bidder 2 as a ratio-
nal loser and denote the associated bid b2(b1, v2)
by g(b1, v2). To be rational, behavior is as follows.
PROPOSITION 2. g(b1, v2)< b1 for all v2 < b1.
If bidder 2 observes b1 < v2, she will overbid
b1, with truthful bidding (v2) being focal. Alto-
gether the equilibrium bid of an informed bidder
2 is given by
(2) b2(b1, v2) =
{
v2 if b1 ≤ v2,
g(b1, v2) otherwise.












where u(⋅) is bidder 1’s differentiable and strictly
increasing utility function.
If g(b1, v2) is continuous, differentiable, and
weakly increasing in both arguments, the first-
order condition (valid for b1 ∈ [0, 1)) is












PROPOSITION 3. If g(b1, v2) is continuous, dif-
ferentiable, and weakly increasing in both argu-
ments, then any interior equilibrium strategy
b1(v1) must be consistent with (3).
According to Proposition 3, multiple equilib-
ria differ in g(b1, v2), the conditional bid of a
rational loser. In the following we distinguish
7. Even without leaks, second-price auctions have mul-
tiple equilibria, but in weakly dominated strategies, see for
example Plum (1992) and Blume and Heidhues (2004).
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TABLE 1
Equilibria and Expected Outcomes for F Uniform on [0, 1] and r1 = r2 = 0













































three focal equilibria: in SP-Truthful, a rational
loser bids her true value g(b1, v2) = v2, in which
case bidder 1 to also bid her value in equilib-
rium. In SP-Spiteful, a rational loser leaves as
little for bidder 1 as possible by slightly under-
bidding him with g(b1, v2)↗ b1, setting the price
for bidder 1 at b1, similar to first-price auc-
tions. Accordingly, b1 is lower in equilibrium
for higher leak probabilities, and is higher for
higher risk aversion. Finally, in SP-Cooperative,
a rational loser favors bidder 1 and harms the
seller by setting g(b1, v2) = 0. In this case, bidder
1 gains his full value in case of a leak, incen-
tivizing him to increase his bid above his value
as p increases, thereby improving the chance of
exploiting a leak. By doing so, bidder 1 is exposed
to negative profits if there is no leak, hence bids
decrease with risk aversion. As p approaches 1,
cooperative bidding has bidder 1 bidding equal
to or above one (independent of v2) and bidder
2 bidding zero. These intuitions are formalized
in the following proposition (for the proof, see
Appendix A.3).
PROPOSITION 4. In the focal SPA equilibria,
the bid of bidder 1 depends on g(b1, v2) as fol-
lows:
• SP-Truthful: g(b1, v2) = v2 and b1(v1) = v1.
• SP-Spiteful8: g(b1, v2) = b1. With risk neu-




ticular, for F uniform, we have b1(v1) =
v1
1+p .
When u is concave, bidding is above that of risk
neutrality.
• SP-Cooperative: g(b1, v2) = 0. With risk-
neutrality, we have b1(v1) =
v1
1−p for v1 ≤ 1− p
and b1(v1)≥ 1 otherwise. When u is concave,
bidding is below that under risk neutrality.
8. For the existence of a monotonic strategy by bidder




Table 1 summarizes the ex ante expected first-
mover and second-mover surplus, seller revenue,
and efficiency in the FPA equilibrium and the
three focal equilibria of the SPA for the uniform
distribution and risk neutrality.9
Proposition 4 determines whether the equilib-
rium bid function is above or below the risk neu-
tral solution. Under more restrictive preferences,
it is possible to be more specific. The following
remark illustrates the equilibria for CRRA prefer-
ences in SP-Spiteful, and for constant relative risk
aversion (CARA) preferences in SP-Cooperative
(where losses are possible and CRRA is therefore
undefined). For details, see Appendix A.4.
REMARK 1. With risk aversion,
A. with SP-Spiteful and CRRA preferences




the reverse hazard rate is decreasing, bidding
increases in r.
B. with SP-Cooperative and CARA prefer-
ences, bidding decreases in r.
While in our analysis the support of F is [0,
1], in the first price auction and SP-Spiteful a
different support merely results in a shift of the
equilibrium to that new support. For instance, in
a first price auction with uniform distribution of
valuations on [0,1], the equilibrium is to bid half
one’s value (under risk neutrality). If the distribu-
tion is uniform on [1,2], the equilibrium is to bid
v−1
2
+ 1. With SP-Truthful and SP-Cooperative,
the equilibrium is not shifted with the support.
While we have treated g(b1, v2) as a repre-
sentation of a pure strategy, it can also repre-
sent the expectation of a mixed strategy by bid-
der 2 or the expectation of several heterogeneous
strategies used by different possible players. For
instance, if fraction 𝛼 play the strategy of SP-
Spiteful and 1− 𝛼 use SP-Cooperative—or any
9. See Appendix A.5 for calculations.
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strategy where the expectation of bidder 2’s strat-
egy is 𝛼 ⋅ b1 —then any equilibrium will have
the first bidder behave as if bidder 2 is playing
g(b1, v2) = 𝛼 ⋅ b1.
COROLLARY 2. With risk neutrality, in all
equilibria of SPA where the expected strategy of
the second bidder obeys (1) and (2) with g(b1, v2)
= 𝛼 ⋅ b1 + 𝛽 ⋅ v2 (where 𝛼, 𝛽 ≥ 0 and 𝛼 + 𝛽 ≤ 1),
we have the first bidder choosing b1 according




the uniform case, bidder 1’s equilibrium strategy
reduces to b1(v1) =
v1
1−p+(2𝛼+𝛽)p .
From Corollary 2, we see that in the uniform
case g(b1, v2) can be reduced to a linear function




. When 𝛼 = 1/2, bidding by bidder 1
is truthful. With increasing 𝛼 or 𝛽, bidding by
bidder 1 becomes less aggressive. This is true
not only when F is uniform, but for general F
(under a decreasing reverse hazard rate). This is
true more generally when comparing equilibria.
Suppose there are two equilibria, k and l, based
on equilibrium strategies gk(b1, v2) and b
k
1(v1) for
equilibrium k and gl(b1, v2) and b
l
1(v1) for l, then
the following proposition holds:
PROPOSITION 5. Under risk neutrality, if F is







b1 ≥ 0, v2 ≥ 0, then bk1(v1) < bl1(v1) for all v1 > 0.
Proof. The RHS of Equation (3) is (a) equal to
0 for b1 = 0, (b) strictly increasing in b1, and
(c) strictly larger for gk than for gl. Thus, for a
particular v1 > 0, the b1 that equates both sides
for gk is strictly smaller than for gl. Hence, we
have bk1(v1) < b
l
1(v1) for all v1 > 0. ◾
Intuitively, Proposition 5 says that a more
aggressive bidder 2 induces bidder 1 to bid less
aggressively.
We close this section with two comments
on the likelihood of leaks in view of the the-
oretical analysis. Namely, are bidders likely to
initiate leaks, either leaking their own bids or
attempting to discover another’s bid? In FPA,
leaks benefit the second mover, which provides
incentives for espionage, either directly or by col-
luding with the auctioneer, as assumed in the
Russian procurement auctions alluded to in the
introduction. While there is no reason to expect
that such leaks are confined to first-price auc-
tions, no such comparable data are available for
second-price auctions. There are, however, two
theoretical arguments suggesting that leaks will
occur in SPA. In this, we assume that a bidder can
choose to leak or spy before the realization of her
value, and that this decision is commonly known.
Choosing to do so results in an exogenous prob-
ability p (which depends on the leak technology)
of a leak.
First, some bidders may be known to have
cooperative or spiteful inclinations towards other
bidders,10 which narrows down the equilibria to
the cooperative or spiteful equilibrium, respec-
tively. A spiteful second mover bidder whose type
is commonly known can benefit from engaging
in espionage, as the other bidder will respond
by lowering her bid. Conversely, a bidder who
knows the other bidder to be cooperative can ben-
efit from leaking her own (inflated) bid, expecting
the second mover to bid low.
A second argument follows a forwards induc-
tion type logic. By choosing to spy, the second
mover signals her intention to coordinate on an
equilibrium that will earn her more than she could
get by not spying. Formally, we impose the two
following conditions on the equilibria:
1. We only consider equilibria in non-weakly
dominated strategies.
2. Players’ beliefs assign a positive probabil-
ity only to strategies that are part of some equi-
librium.
Given condition 1, if the second mover
chooses not to spy, bidders bid their value for an
ex-ante expected payoff of 1
6
. This eliminates all
leak-equilibria where the second mover obtains
a lower payoff, and in particular the cooperative
equilibrium. By condition 2, if the second mover
chooses to spy, then the first mover makes a bid
(that is part of an equilibrium) that implies an
expected payoff of at least 1
6
to the second mover.
Spying now weakly dominates not spying.11
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We ran six sessions, three for first-price
and three for second-price auction. Each ses-
sion included 32 student participants from
universities in Jena, Germany, recruited using
10. Rational losers allocate the surplus between the auc-
tioneer and the auction winner, reflecting specific inclinations
towards one or both. For example, if the bidders are industry
competitors, one may benefit from harming the other.
11. Related forwards induction notions such as the intu-
itive criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987) are not applicable
because the second bidder’s action as a rational loser does not
affect her own payoff.
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TABLE 2










Baseline 0 − −
One-sided-1/4 1/4 0 1
One-sided-1/2 1/2 0 1
One-sided-3/4 3/4 0 1
Two-sym 1 1/2 1/2
Two-asym 1 1/4 3/4
Notes: The analyses reported in the paper are based on the
baseline and one-sided treatments.
ORSEE (Greiner 2015). The experiment was
programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). At
the beginning of the session, participants were
randomly allocated to the roles of Bidder A or
Bidder B and remained in these roles throughout
the experiment. In each period, participants were
matched in pairs of Bidder A and Bidder B within
matching groups of eight.
The experiment included six treatments, vary-
ing in the probability that one bidder is informed
of the other’s bid before making a bid. In the base-
line treatment, the probability of a leak was zero.
In three one-sided treatments, Bidder B could dis-
cover Bidder A’s bid with probabilities of 1/4,
1/2, and 3/4, respectively. To this basic design we
added two two-sided treatments. In the two-sym
treatment, either Bidder B could observe Bidder
A’s bid or vice versa, with equal probabilities.
In two-asym, Bidder B could observe Bidder A’s
bid with probability 3/4, and otherwise Bidder A
could observe Bidder B’s bid. Table 2 summa-
rizes the experimental treatments.
The two-sided treatments were not part of the
main experiment, and were designed to test a sec-
ondary hypothesis, namely whether issues of pro-
cedural fairness affect equilibrium selection.12
As the results rejected this hypothesis, we do not
discuss it here further. Note also that, in contrast
to the one-sided treatments, where participants
participate in one auction either as a first or as a
second mover, in the two-sided treatments partic-
ipants simultaneously participate in two auctions,
once as a first mover and once as a second mover.
The results suggest that this difference in pro-
tocol affected behavior, precluding comparisons
12. We hypothesized that the highly unequal, yet effi-
cient from the bidders’ point of view, ex-post payoffs in SPA-
Cooperative would be more acceptable if there is ex-ante sym-
metry (cf. Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels 2005; Krawczyk
and Le Lec 2010).
between the one-sided and two-sided treatments.
Hence the results reported in this paper focus on
the one-sided treatments. For full details, see Fis-
cher et al. (2017).
The experiment included 36 periods arranged
in 6 blocks of 6 periods, with 1 period for each of
the 6 treatments in every block. The order of the
treatments within each block was independently
randomized for each matching group in the FPA
sessions, and repeated for the SPA sessions to
facilitate comparison across auction mechanisms.
In each period, each bidder was assigned
a privately known value drawn independently
from the uniform distribution on [20.00,120.00]
in steps of 0.01. All bids were restricted to
be between 0.00 and 140.00 in steps of 0.01.
Figure 1 plots the ex ante expected first-mover
and second-mover surplus, seller revenue, and
efficiency in the FPA equilibrium and the three
focal equilibria of the SPA for the experimental
parameters as a function of leak probability (cf.
Table 1). Note that outcomes for FPA and SP-
Spiteful are highly similar throughout.
We used the strategy method with respect to
the realization of a leak as follows. The relevant
leak probabilities were announced at the begin-
ning of the period. Bidding then proceeded in
two stages, corresponding to the unconditional
and conditional bidding. First, both participants
had to submit an unconditional bid. In all treat-
ments other than the baseline, the potential sec-
ond mover(s), was next (were) informed about the
unconditional bid of the other bidder and submit-
ted a conditional bid. Once all bids were placed, a
random draw determined if there was a leak (and,
in the two-sided treatments, in which direction).
In case of a leak, the conditional bid of the second
mover was used to determine the outcome of the
auction. Note that using the conditional bid of one
participant necessarily implies that the uncondi-
tional bid of the other participant was used. At the
end of the period, participants received feedback
about the outcome of the random draw (if appli-
cable), the relevant bids, the winner of the auction
and their own earnings for the period.
The instructions used nontechnical and
unloaded terminology (see Appendix S2, Sup-
porting information). We first explained the
experimental game in play method, followed by
a set of computerized control questions, to ascer-
tain that participants understood the instructions.
Once all participants successfully answered the
control questions, we distributed a new set of
instructions detailing the two-stage procedure.
We randomly selected 5 of the 36 rounds for





























































payment. If the sum in these rounds was negative,
they were subtracted from a show-up fee of €2.50
and an additional payment of €2.50 for answering
the control questionnaire. Participants with any
remaining negative balance would be required
to work it off, however this never occurred.13
Experimental currency unit payoffs were con-
verted to money at the end of the experiment at
a conversion rate of 1 ECU = €0.13 (approx-
imately 0.177 USD). Sessions lasted between
85 and 135 minutes (including admission and
payment) and the average payment was €15.41.
A. Experimental Hypotheses
Our main interest is in testing the predictions
of the theoretical model and—in second-price
13. For this purpose we had a special program prepared
in which a participant would have to count the letter “t” in the
German constitution, with each paragraph reducing the debt
by €0.50.
auctions, where the model does not provide exact
predictions—exploring behavior in view of the
focal equilibria. The first three hypotheses are
drawn directly from the theoretical analysis, and
the fourth hypothesis touches on behavior in SPA
in view of the equilibrium analysis.
Hypothesis 1 reflects optimality in the last
stage of the game, as formalized in Equation (2).
Hypothesis 1. Conditional bids bi(bj, vi) are
optimal, that is,
a. in FPA, bi(bj, vi) = bj if bj ≤ vi and
bi(bj, vi)< bj otherwise.
b. in SPA, bi(bj, vi)≥ bj if bj ≤ vi and
bi(bj, vi)< bj otherwise.
The next two hypotheses describe equilibrium
strategies and outcomes in FPA. First, Proposi-
tion 1 implies that equilibrium unconditional bids
b1 and b2(∅, v2) are invariant to the leak probabil-
ity in FPA.
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Hypothesis 2. In FPA, unconditional bids by first
movers and second movers, b1(v1) and b2(∅, v2),
respectively, are unaffected by changes in leak-
probability.
The next hypothesis is drawn directly from
the theoretical predictions summarized in Table 1
and Figure 1.
Hypothesis 3. In FPA, the second-mover sur-
plus increases and the first-mover surplus, seller
revenue, and efficiency decrease with increasing
leak probability.
Moving to SPA, Proposition 5 implies that
unconditional bids of first movers b1(v1) in differ-
ent equilibria may be below or above v1, and that
the deviation of the bid from the value increases
with the leak probability. We therefore do not
have specific predictions for SPA. Nonetheless,
we hypothesize that bidders naturally use one of
the three focal equilibria, Truthful, Spiteful, or
Cooperative, and that there is intra-person con-
sistency in rational loser strategies.
Hypothesis 4. The three equilibria in SPA char-
acterized in Proposition 4 are focal, that is,
a. Most rational-loser bids are consistent with
one of the three equilibria.
b. Individual rational losers tend to bid con-
sistently according to one of the three equilibria.
Finally, the theoretical analysis has no clear
predictions regarding aggregate outcomes (effi-
ciency, revenue, and bidder surplus) in SPA,
as these vary substantially depending on the
selected equilibrium. In SP-Truthful, bids and
aggregate outcomes are invariant to leaks. In
other equilibria, leaks reduce efficiency and seller
revenue, and either increase or decrease the first
mover’s surplus while having the opposite effect
on the second mover’s surplus. Accordingly, we
do not state a formal hypothesis, but nonethe-
less aim to use our data to address the questions
of how outcomes in SPA—and their compari-
son to FPA—vary with leak probability as an
exploratory analysis.
IV. RESULTS
We first show that bidding strategies and
aggregate outcomes—buyers’ surplus, seller
revenue, and efficiency—in FPA largely confirm
the theoretical predictions stated in Hypothe-
ses 1–3. We proceed to the more exploratory
analysis of behavior and outcomes in SPA and
conclude by commenting on the comparison
between FPA and SPA. The analysis is restricted
to the baseline and the one-sided treatments
only.14 When reporting results of mixed-effects
regressions, these are based on maximum like-
lihood estimations of models of the general
form
ygit = xgit𝛽 + ug + ei + ϵgit
with x being the vector of regressors, g indicat-
ing the matching group, i the participant, and t
the experimental round (period). Error term ei
is nested in ug and all error terms, including ϵ,
are assumed to be orthogonal to each other and
the regressors. In other words, ug and ei are ran-
dom group and individual effects, respectively.
To control for potential learning effects in the first
periods, we cross checked our results by running
the same analysis once without the first observa-
tion of every treatment, and once excluding the
first two repetitions. Unless mentioned otherwise,
the results remain qualitatively unchanged. For
ease of notation we will call role A and B bid-
ders in the p = 0 treatments first-mover (FM) and
second-mover (SM), respectively.
A. First-Price Auctions
Conditional Bids in FPA. We analyze the bid-
ding behavior backwards, starting with condi-
tional bids of informed second bidders. We cat-
egorize these bids into the five categories sum-
marized in Table 3. The table reveals that bids
are largely optimal. In 231 auctions the second
mover could not profit from winning the auc-
tion, and indeed placed a winning bid in only one
case. When the second mover could profit from
winning, she did so in 619 of 633 (97.8%) of
cases. Of these, 510 (82.4%) are optimal in the
sense of extracting (almost) the maximal surplus
by bidding no more than one unit above the first
mover’s bid. Winning bids above b1 + 1 resulted
in an average forgone gain of 16.8 ECU, or 31.5%
of the maximum possible. Mixed-effects regres-
sions of relative loss—defined as the forgone
surplus divided by the maximum possible—on
valuation, leak probability, and period reveal no
significant effects for valuation (𝛽 = − .001,
p= .233), leak probability (𝛽 = − .107, p= .268),
or period (𝛽 = − .001, p = .772). Despite some
suboptimality, the first part of Hypothesis 1 is
therefore confirmed.
14. The two-sided treatments were not part of the main
experiment and due to procedural differences cannot directly
be compared with one-sided treatments. For full details, see
Fischer et al. (2017).
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TABLE 3
Conditional Bids in FPA
Second Mover Can Gain Second Mover Wins
Category b1 < v2 b2 ≥ b1 Optimal Proportion of Bids
Optimal loss No No Yes 26.6%
Win at a loss No Yes No 0.1%
Optimal win Yes Yes Yes 59.0%
Non-optimal win Yes Yes No 12.6%
Lose and forgo gains Yes No No 1.6%
Notes:b1 and b2 are short for b1(v1) and b2(b1, v2), respectively. An optimal win is defined as b1 ≤ b2 ≤ b1 + 1 (to allow for
rounding). Non-optimal win is defined as b1 + 1< b2 < v2.
RESULT 1. Conditional bids in FPA are mostly
optimal. Bidders rarely lose the auction when
winning could have been profitable, or win the
auction while losing money. Some bids do not
extract the entire possible gain (independent of
leak probability).
Unconditional Bids in FPA. Table 4 presents
mixed-effects regressions of the unconditional
bids of first and second movers on the value
(normalized to set the lower bound at zero) and
leak probability, either as a continuous vari-
able (columns 1 and 3) or as discrete treatments
(columns 2 and 4).15 From Proposition 1, if
assuming risk neutrality the intercept should be
20 and the slope of v′ equal to 0.5, irrespective of
role and leak probability. The results in the first
two columns show that for the first mover the con-
stant is significantly lower than 20 (𝜒2(1)= 34.92
and 𝜒2(1) = 25.16, respectively, p< .001) and
the slope is highly significantly higher than 0.5
(𝜒2(1) = 18.55 and 𝜒2(1) = 16.86, respectively,
p< .001), which can be explained by risk aver-
sion. As predicted, there is no significant effect
for leak probability (𝜒2(1) = 0.02, p = .884
for continuous leak probability; 𝜒2(3) = 0.55,
p = .909 for the joint leak probability treatment
effect).
The picture is somewhat different for sec-
ond movers. The intercept is closer to the pre-
dicted 20 (𝜒2(1) = 2.71, p = 0.100 with contin-
uous leak probability; 𝜒2(1) = 1.27, p = 0.260
with leak probability treatments). The slope is
still highly significantly higher than the 0.5 pre-
dicted for risk neutrality (𝜒2(1) = 24.90 and
𝜒2(1) = 18.51 in columns 3 and 4, respectively).
The main difference is that we see lower bids for
higher leak probability (𝜒2(1) = 3.68, p = 0.055
15. To maintain comparability across treatments, here
and in SPA we only consider Bidder A’s bids in the baseline
treatment.
for continuous leak probability; 𝜒2(3) = 7.45,
p = 0.059 for the joint leak probability treatment
effect). We conjecture that when a bidder expects
to have a chance to revise the current bid, she
becomes less risk averse, pushing the bid towards
the risk neutral Nash bid as the probability of
revision goes up. Consistent with this interpreta-
tion, we find no significant difference in the mean
bid between first and second mover for leak prob-
ability zero (Δ = 1.82, z = 1.46, p = 0.143).16
In fact, the difference is only significant for leak
probability 3/4 (Δ = 7.59, z = 7.54, p< 0.001),
although the joint test across all four leak prob-
ability levels is not significant (𝜒2(4) = 4.94,
p = 0.294).
RESULT 2. Unconditional bids in FPA are
mostly in line with Hypothesis 2, as the effects
of leak probability are small and restricted to
second movers.
Aggregate Outcomes in FPA. Do the small devia-
tions from equilibrium bidding affect the qualita-
tive predictions for the auction outcomes, that is,
bidders’ surplus, seller’s revenue and efficiency?
Table 5 presents the key outcomes. As predicted,
higher leak probabilities increase the probabil-
ity that the second mover wins the auction, lead-
ing to a high expected payoff. As a result, the
expected first mover’s payoff and seller’s revenue
both decrease. As leaks favor the second mover
even if the first mover’s valuation is higher, they
reduce efficiency.
Table 6 presents mixed-effects regressions
confirming that the effects of leaks are significant.
The only exception that does not reach signif-
icance is the reduction in the probability of an
16. Based on a mixed-effects regression that includes the
transformed value, dummies for leak probability treatments,
role (first or second mover), and all two-way and three-way




Unconditional Bids in FPA
First Mover Second Mover
Constant 14.700*** 14.911*** 17.685*** 18.070***
(16.39) (14.70) (12.57) (10.54)
v′ 0.622*** 0.633*** 0.605*** 0.606***
(20.88) (20.54) (28.68) (24.61)
pLeak 0.205 −5.118*
(0.15) (−1.92)
v′ × probability 0.037 −0.093*
(0.98) (−1.86)
Leak probability 1/4 −0.190 −2.669
(−0.22) (−1.52)
Leak probability 1/2 −0.643 −2.183
(−0.38) (−1.19)
Leak probability 3/4 0.390 −4.421**
(0.37) (−2.14)
v′ × 1/4 −0.014 −0.024
(−0.55) (−0.77)
v′ × 1/2 0.001 −0.046
(0.03) (−1.19)
v′ × 3/4 0.024 −0.070*
(0.72) (−1.86)
N 1152 1152 1152 1152
𝜒2 1749.0 3462.3 1601.2 9525.1
Notes: Linear mixed-effects regressions with random intercept effects on participant nested in effect on matching group. t
statistics in parentheses based on Huber White sandwich estimation of standard errors *p< .1; **p< .05; ***p< .01. Transformed
valuation v′ = v− 20 used instead of v.
TABLE 5












(High Value Wins) Efficiency
p = 0 0.47 12.28 0.53 13.13 58.71 0.84 0.98
p = 1/4 0.46 12.13 0.54 17.50 56.57 0.83 0.97
p = 1/2 0.38 9.99 0.62 20.80 53.27 0.81 0.96
p = 3/4 0.39 8.95 0.61 20.59 52.67 0.78 0.95
Notes: Ex ante expected values given bidders’ strategies and leak probability. Efficiency is defined as the winner’s value
divided by the highest value.
efficient outcome, however the effect of leaks on
efficiency is highly significant. Hypothesis 3 is
thus confirmed.
RESULT 3. Leaks in first-price auctions
increase the second mover’s surplus, and
decrease the first mover’s surplus, seller’s
revenue and overall efficiency.
B. Second-Price Auctions
Conditional Bids in SPA. Conditional bids in
second-price auctions are mostly optimal. In 415
of 864 (48.0%) of the auctions, the first mover’s
bid was weakly below the second mover’s value.
In 393 (94.7%) of these, the second mover placed
a winning bid. Eleven of the 22 auctions in which
the second mover did not extract the possible
gain, occurred in the first 8 of the 36 periods.
Of the other 449 auctions in which the second
mover could not make a profit, the second mover
placed a losing bid in 443 (98.7%). With 97% of
all conditional bids optimal, the second part of
Hypothesis 1 is confirmed.
RESULT 4. Conditional bids in SPA are mostly
optimal. Bidders rarely lose the auction when
winning could have been profitable, or win the
auction while losing money.
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TABLE 6
Outcomes in FPA
Prob(FM Wins) FM Surplus Prob(SM Wins) SM Surplus
Constant 0.478*** 13.829*** 0.522*** 14.478***
(23.03) (16.29) (25.11) (8.56)
Leak probability −0.122*** −4.895*** 0.122*** 6.240**
(−4.04) (−3.56) (4.04) (1.98)
Period −0.000 −0.063* 0.000 0.111
(−0.38) (−1.69) (0.38) (1.57)
N 1152 1152 1152 864
𝜒2 17.3 15.1 17.3 5.5
Revenue Prob(High Value Wins) Efficiency
Constant 56.411*** 0.815*** 0.969***
(35.73) (29.89) (137.25)
Leak probability −8.509*** −0.075 −0.033***
(−7.80) (−1.57) (−3.94)
Period 0.113* 0.001*** 0.001**
(1.78) (2.80) (2.03)
N 1152 1152 1152
𝜒2 62.0 10.3 18.8
Notes: Linear mixed-effects regressions with random intercept effects on participant nested in effect on matching group. t
statistics in parentheses based on Huber White sandwich estimation of standard errors *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Our main analysis of SPA pertains to Rational
Losers. In total, in 45.5% of all cases the informed
second bidder had a lower valuation than the
first bid (v2 < b1) and underbid in order to lose.
17
Table 7 presents a breakdown of conditional bids
of rational losers according to the focal equilibria
strategies. In total, 61.1% of bids fall into one of
the three focal categories. That this is intentional
coordination on the focal equilibria gains support
from the comparison to FPA. In FPA, rational
loser bids are not payoff relevant, hence their
distribution provides a natural “null” distribution
against which to compare the SPA bids. If it is
the focal equilibria that drive rational loser bids
in SPA, we should expect to see a different bid
distribution in FPA. This is confirmed as in FPA
the comparable share is 42.61%, mostly driven by
28.7% of rational losers in FPA who bid between
0 and 1. In particular, around one in four rational
loser bid in SPA is spiteful, whereas no rational
loser in FPA ever placed a bid within 1 ECU of
the first bid.
Individual Types. Hypothesis 4b states that ratio-
nal loser bids are consistent within individuals.
We test this hypothesis by looking at the distri-
bution of bid types, as categorized in Table 7.
17. This proportion is less than the 50% expected by
chance if first bidders bid their value since, in contrast to the
typical overbidding in second-price auctions, first bidders bid,










1< g(b1, v2)< v2 − 1 16.5%
Truthful v2 − 1≤ g(b1, v2)≤ v2 + 1 20.4%
Between truthful
and spiteful
v2 + 1< g(b1, v2)< b1 − 1 22.4%
Spiteful b1 − 1< g(b1, v2)< b1 24.7%
Notes: We categorize focal equilibria bids up to deviations
of 1 ECU to allow for rounding, as many bidders places
integer bids.
The number of times that a second mover in SPA
was a rational loser varied from 4 (2 participants)
to 12 (1 participant) periods, with an average of
8.2 and a standard deviation of 2.0. For every
individual we measure consistency by calculat-
ing the share C of the most common category
bid among all rational loser bids by that par-
ticipant. For example, for a second mover who
always made a Cooperative rational loser bid,
C = 1, and for someone who made four ratio-
nal loser bids of which three are Spiteful and
one Cooperative, C = 0.75. In the first column
of Table 8 we report the empirical share of sec-
ond movers who always used the same category
bid (p(C = 1)), the share who used their most
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TABLE 8
Measures of Intra-Individual Consistency as
Rational Losers
Simulation
Statistic Empirical Mean SD Maximum
p(C = 1) 16.7% 0.1% 0.3% 6.3%
p(C ≥ 0.75) 39.6% 1.2% 1.5% 12.3%
Mean(C) 0.69 0.40 0.01 0.48
Median(C) 0.71 0.39 0.02 0.48
Notes: C indicates the share of bids from the most frequent
bid category (e.g., Cooperative) for a single individual, and
p(C) is the share of (simulated) participants with C. Simula-
tion statistics based on 1,000,000 Monte-Carlo permutations.
common category bid at least 75% of the time
(p(C ≥ 0.75)), as well as the mean and the median
of consistency measure C. To test the hypotheses
that the distribution statistics on C reflect individ-
ual consistency, we ran Monte-Carlo permutation
tests with 1 million repetitions, which are sum-
marized in the remaining columns of Table 8.18
For all four statistics, the empirical observation is
well above the simulated distribution, providing
strong evidence for intra-individual consistency
beyond that expected by chance given the distri-
bution of rational loser bids.
As an additional test of individual consistency,
we regressed the relative conditional bids defined
as conditional bids divided by the observed first
bid (𝛼2 = [b2(b1, v2)− 20]/(b1 − 20), cf. Corol-
lary 2), on a constant with fixed participant
effects, resulting in an adjusted R2 = 0.508. Thus
much of the variation in the data is due to type
heterogeneity. On average, the relative condi-
tional bid is 0.51. Note that, by Corollary 2, this
implies that risk neutral first movers should bid
(approximately) truthfully.
To complete the picture, we analyze individual
types by categorizing participants based on the
mean absolute deviation from the focal equilib-
rium bids. We find that 41.67% of individuals bid
closest to truthful, 37.50% bid closest to spiteful,
and 20.83% bid closest to cooperative. Overall,
the median absolute deviation from the closest
focal bid is 1.30, and the median of the average
absolute deviation for each individual given her
type is 12.05.19
18. These tests generate the null distribution given the
empirical distribution of bid categories and the empirical
distribution of number of rational loser bids per bidder.
19. For comparison, we repeated this analysis on simu-
lated bids, by replacing every conditional bid b2(b1, v2) for
v2 < b1 with a random draw from the uniform distribution
RESULT 5. The three focal equilibria in SPA—
Cooperative, Truthful, and Spiteful—account for
most rational loser bids. Furthermore, individu-
als tend to bid consistently (although not exclu-
sively) in line with one of the focal equilibria,
confirming Hypothesis 4.
Unconditional Bids in SPA. Table A in Appendix
S1 presents mixed-effects regressions of the
unconditional bids of first and second movers on
the value (normalized to set the lower bound at
zero) and leak probability (cf. Table 4). The esti-
mated bid functions do not deviate significantly
from truthful bidding, that is, a constant of 20
and a slope of 1 on the transformed value. These
bidding strategies are roughly consistent with
money maximizing.20
Aggregate Outcomes in SPA. Unconditional bids
are, on average, close to truthful bidding, and in
the absence of systematic deviations we expect
the aggregate outcomes not to vary, on average,
with leak probabilities. Mixed-effects regressions
of the different outcomes measures on leak proba-
bility confirm this result (see Table C in Appendix
S1 for details).
RESULT 6. Leaks in second-price auctions have
nonsignificant and mostly inconsistent effects on
bidders’ surplus, seller’s revenue, and efficiency.
Comparison of Auction Mechanisms. We con-
clude the analysis with an exploratory compari-
son of outcomes between FPA and SPA. Table 9
reports the marginal effects of the second-price
mechanism over the first-price mechanism on
bidders’ surplus, seller’s revenue, and efficiency
based on mixed-effects regressions of the out-
come on mechanism interacted with treatment
and period.21 The results in the baseline treat-
ment (p= 0) match the existing experimental auc-
tions, namely overbidding in FPA leads to higher
seller revenue and lower bidders’ surplus. Over-
bidding in FPA is independent of the leak prob-
ability. With leaks, however, an additional effect
[0, b1]. The results of 10,000 such simulations yielded an
average median deviation of conditional bids from the closest
type of 21.61 (SD 1.15) and an average median deviation from
the individual type (based on the simulated bids) of 26.25 (SD
1.17).
20. For second movers bidding truthfully is weakly dom-
inant. For first movers, it is best response to the empirical
rational loser behavior (cf. Corollary 2 and the analysis of
relative conditional bids above).
21. See also the aggregate outcomes in SPA reported in
Table B in Appendix S1.
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TABLE 9
Differences in Outcomes in SPA over FPA
FM Surplus SM Surplus Revenue Efficiency
p = 0 5.149*** 2.671* −6.379*** 0.004
(3.37) (1.75) (−3.10) (0.57)
p = 1/4 2.983* −0.759 −1.850 0.011
(1.82) (−0.35) (−1.07) (1.54)
p = 1/2 5.352*** −0.523 −3.289 0.021***
(3.33) (−0.19) (−1.61) (2.70)
p = 3/4 6.330*** −5.972** 0.478 0.021**
(4.05) (−2.18) (0.23) (2.43)
N 2304 2304 2304 2304
Notes: Marginal effects of mechanism (SPA−FPA) based
on linear mixed-effects regressions of outcome on mechanism
interacted with treatment and period, with random intercept
effects on participant nested in effect on matching group.
t statistics in parentheses based on Huber White sandwich
estimation of standard errors *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
comes into play, as leaks in FPA favor the second
mover to the disadvantage of the first mover and
the seller. In comparison, leaks have little effect in
SPA due to the selected equilibrium. As a result,
leaks eliminate the revenue dominance of first-
price over second price auctions at least for leak
probabilities p = 1/4 and p = 3/4. For p = 1/2 we
still observe considerably higher prices in FPA,
and once we exclude the first or the first two rep-
etitions of every treatment from the analysis, this
effect becomes significant (𝛽 = − 4.526, p = .028
and 𝛽 = − 5.185, p = .013, respectively). Finally,
overbidding and the systematic favoring of poten-
tially weak second-movers by leaks in first-price
auctions lead to higher efficiency in SPA for high
leak probabilities.22
RESULT 7. Without leaks, first-price auctions
favor the seller at the expense of the bidders.
Leaks shift surplus from the seller to the sec-
ond mover, eliminating the revenue dominance
of first-price auctions in most treatments, and
resulting in higher second-mover profits in first-
price auctions.
V. CONCLUSION
The most prominent auction formats are first-
and second-price sealed-bid auctions, along with
their strategically equivalent Dutch and (for
independent private values) English auctions.
22. For leak probability p = 1/4 this effect is significant
once we exclude either the first or the first two repetitions from
the analysis, with 𝛽 = 0.014, p = .092 and 𝛽 = 0.020, p = .004,
respectively.
Previous experimental evidence suggests that, in
case of independent private values, the first-price
rule generates higher seller revenue, while the
second-price rule is more efficient23 but prone to
ring formation.24 While research has looked into
effects of private value revelation, informing late
bidders about earlier bids has, to the best of our
knowledge, so far been neglected.
Firms can be large organizations with var-
ious shareholders and stakeholders. Especially
for complex custom goods and services, firms
go through protracted price finding procedures
involving various levels of management. At every
stage one risks that information about the bid-
ding strategy may be leaked to competitors. For
example, the winner in an ascending bid auc-
tion for building rights is often required to make
a down payment. If this has to be pre-approved
or a credit line must be negotiated, there are
many such opportunities. In addition to industrial
espionage and corruption, early bids can also be
revealed in error.
Our theoretical analysis questions stylized
empirical facts from private value auctions
without revelation of early bids. Moreover, com-
parative statics across price rules are ambiguous
due to multiple equilibria in second-price
auctions. The experimental outcomes of the
first-price auctions are as (game-) theoretically
predicted: Unconditional bids are not affected
by leak probability, but actual leaks reduce
seller revenue, overall efficiency, and first mover
payoff while increasing that of second movers.
Interestingly, these qualitative effects hold in
spite of significant deviations from equilibrium
bidding by first movers and uninformed second
movers.
For both price rules, bids by informed second
movers are overwhelmingly rational. In the sec-
ond price auction, where informed second bids
are crucial for equilibrium selection, we iden-
tify two crucial behavioral regularities. First, the
majority of bids approximate one of the three
focal types; truthful, spiteful, or cooperative. Sec-
ond, we see individual consistency in bidding pat-
terns. Which bidding type is more prevalent in
application should depend on context. Imagine,
for example, a firm bidding in an English auc-
tion who suspects that its rival (who is committed
to participating in the auction) may have discov-
ered its reserve price. How far should it expect
23. Heterogeneous risk aversion is able to rationalize
both phenomena.
24. Gandenberger (1961) shows that historically they
were avoided in public procurement.
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the rival to push the price? It is reasonable to
assume that if the firms are competitors beyond
the current auction, the rival is more likely to be
spiteful than if the firms are otherwise in com-
plementary relations. Nonetheless, we show that
even in minimal laboratory settings that are free
of such broad incentives and considerations, indi-
viduals have basic preferences that guide their
biddings. Furthermore, all three focal types are
fairly prevalent in the population. This insight is
generalizable across many applications, even if
the specific distribution of bidder types is not.
Our behavioral conclusions are in line with
those of (Andreoni, Che, and Kim (2007), who
similarly manipulate information of bidders
about their opponents. In their experiment with
four bidders valuations rather than bids of others
may be revealed. Thus, their setting does not
invoke strategically adjusted unconditional bids
in second-price auctions, which is one focus
of our theoretical and experimental analysis.
Notwithstanding, we share some of Andreoni,
Che, and Kim’s (2007) conclusions, namely that
weakly dominated bids are rare and less frequent
with more experience; that behavior is qualita-
tively consistent with the comparative statics in
first-price auctions; and that a substantial propor-
tion of second movers with no chance of gaining
from winning the auction overbid their own
value while still underbidding the earlier bid,
suggesting spiteful bidding. Unlike Andreoni,
Che, and Kim (2007), we observe substantial
cooperative bidding, which can be explained
by a fundamental difference between their and
our setup: rational losers in our experiment
know when the first bid is above their valuation,
whereas in Andreoni, Che, and Kim (2007) this
holds only if others bid truthfully. In the latter
case, possible bid shading by others may deter
cooperative bidding.25
We can make some tentative predictions that
go beyond the uniform distributions used in
the experiment for reasons of better participant
comprehension. Arozamena and Weinschel-
baum (2009) showed theoretically that leaks
in first-price auctions should not affect bidding
behavior of uninformed bidders under power
function distributions. Our experiments con-
firm this invariance for uniform distributions,
which is a special case of more general power
distributions. In second price auctions, moving
25. Roth and Ockenfels (2002), for example, suggest that
expecting bid shading from others in second-price auctions
provides a (partial) explanation for sniping in online auctions.
to different distributions may arguably affect
equilibrium selection, but not our main result,
namely that equilibrium selection is systematic
and individually consistent.
One straightforward extension of our model
could introduce marginal entry costs. In this
case, if the leak occurs before the entry com-
mitment, rational losers are expected to abstain
from bidding, and consequently only the cooper-
ative second price auction equilibrium remains.
Other interesting questions arise from endogeniz-
ing the leak probability in the sense of espionage
or strategic leaks. In our setting, incentives for
engaging in espionage are stronger in first- than
second price auctions. Further research, both the-
oretical and experimental, may explore this for
endogenous leaks.
APPENDIX: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. To solve the first-price auction, first look at bidder
2’s optimal bid b2(b1, v2) after seeing b1, bidder 1’s bid.
26 If
b1 ≤ v2, bidding b2(b1, v2) = b1 would let bidder 2 win at the
lowest possible price. For b1 > v2, bidder 2 underbids b1 (by
how much does not affect the outcome). Thus, in equilibrium
b2(b1, v2)
{
= b1 if b1 ≤ v2,
< b1 otherwise.
When chance prevents an information leak, assume b1(v1) and
b2(∅, v2) to be monotonically increasing in the own value v1
and v2, with inverse functions v1(b1) and v2(b2), respectively.
Without loss of generality, assume that u1(0) = u2(0) = 0.
Expected optimality requires for bidder 2
(A.2) 𝜋2(v2) = maxb2
F(v1(b2))u2(v2 − b2).
Similarly, bidder 1 tries to maximize
(A.3)
𝜋1(v1) = maxb1
[pF(b1) + (1 − p)F(v2(b1))]u1(v1 − b1).
The first-order conditions from (A.2) and (A.3) are
F′(v1(b2))v′1(b2)u2(v2(b2) − b2)
= u′2(v2(b2) − b2)F(v1(b2)),
[(1 − p)F′(v2(b1))v′2(b1) + pF
′(b1)]u1(v1(b1) − b1)
= u′1(v1(b1) − b1)[(1 − p)F(v2(b1)) + pF(b1)].
For F uniform and CRRA utility, the first-order conditions
reduce to
v′1(b2)(v2(b2) − b2) = (1 − r)v1(b2),
[(1 − p)v′2(b1) + p](v1(b1) − b1)
= (1 − r)[(1 − p)v2(b1) + pb1],
with the unique solution v1(b1) = (2− r)b1 and v2(b2) =
(2− r)b2, what proves Proposition 1 ◾
26. Whenever we speak optimal of “optimal” or “ra-
tional” behavior, we assume opportunistic preferences, either
in combination with risk neutrality or risk aversion.
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DERIVATION OF COROLLARY 1























































der 2 is informed about b1 and v2 ≥ 12 , bidder 2 expects
to earn v2 −
1
4
, whereas for v2 ≤ 12 , informed bidder 2 can






























der 2’s total expected profit is p 7
24







When F is uniform, with probability 1− p revenue equals
max{v1, v2}/2 as usual. With probability p, however, the




















Since for efficiency, the sum of all expected surpluses of
the seller and both bidders should be 2
3































summarize the above in the following Corollary.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof. For SP-Truthful, since g(b1, v2)= v2 is independent of
b1, the RHS of (3) equals 0. The LHS can only be 0 if v1 = b1.
For SP-Spiteful, when g(b1, v2) = b1, (3) becomes
(A.4)










. When u is strictly concave, this is
strictly greater than 1 for all v1 > b1. For risk neutrality, it is
equal to 1. Hence, when finding the inverse bid function for
the same bid, when utility is concave, v1 − b1 must be smaller.
This implies that bids are higher with concavity than risk-
neutrality.
For SP-Cooperative (g(b1, v2) = 0), (3) becomes
(A.5) pu(v1) + (1 − p)u(v1 − b1) = u(0).
This easily reduces to our result for risk neutrality.
Note in general that b1 > v1 due to monotonicity of utility
and (A.5). Concavity of utility implies a decreasing slope so





u(0) − u(v − b)
0 − (v − b)
.
After rewriting this becomes
(A.7) (u(v) − u(0)) b − v
v
< u(0) − u(v − b).
With risk neutrality (A.5) becomes:
(A.8) pv1 + (1 − p)(v1 − bn1) = 0.
Combining yields
(A.9) (u(v1) − u(0))
p
1 − p
< u(0) − u(v − bn1).
Since (A.5) implies (u(v1) − u(0))
p
1−p = u(0) − u(v1 −
b1), we must have b1 < bn1. ◾
DERIVATION OF REMARK 1
Substituting the CRRA utility into (A.4) yields the CRRA
result with respect to SP-Spiteful.
With SP-Cooperative, for CARA preferences (A.5)
becomes er⋅v1 = p + (1 − p)er⋅b1 . This implies b1 > v1 since
er ⋅ x > 1 for r, x> 0 and is increasing in x. Solving for the




Log(p + (1 − p)er⋅b1 ).
The derivative w.r.t. to r is proportional to
bebr(1 − p)r
ebr(1 − p) + p
− Log(p + ebr(1 − p)).
This is 0 when r = 0 and the derivative w.r.t. r is proportional
to
b2ebr(1 − p)pr
which is strictly positive when p is interior and r > 0. Hence
v1 is increasing in r and bidding is decreasing in r.
OUTCOMES IN SPA
We derive bidder surplus, seller revenue and total effi-
ciency for the three focal equilibria in SPA.
Outcomes in SP-Truthtelling
In the SP-Truthtelling equilibrium neither bids of bidder 1
nor bidder 2 are affected by the leak probability and therefore
all ex-ante expected outcomes are as in the standard simulta-
neous case.
Outcomes in SP-Spiteful Bidding
For F uniform and spiteful bidding, we have b1(v1) =v1





















































1 + 3p(1 + p)
6(1 + p)2
.








































⋅ v1dv1 + p2 ⋅
2 − p
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(b1(1 − p) − b2)db2db1
]
=
1 + p + p2
6
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